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ABSTRACT
In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 the Supreme Court rede-
ﬁned the standard of disclosure in informed consent to medical treatment, rejecting the
application of the doctor-focused Bolam standard in favour of one focused on what was
signiﬁcant to patients. In Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS
Trust [2015] EWHC 3756 (QB), despite acknowledging a new standard now applied,
McGowan J nevertheless used the Bolam test to determine liability for non-disclosure.
This illustrates ongoing judicial deference to the medical profession and this case com-
mentary explores that decision and its implications.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, the Supreme Court
redeﬁned the standard of disclosure for informed consent to medical treatment,
stating that there was ‘no reason to perpetuate the application of the Bolam test in this
context any longer’.1 The Bolam case held that a doctor’s standard of care is to be
VC The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press.
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1 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [86] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reed).
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assessed by reference to a ‘practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medi-
cal men skilled in that particular art’.2 In the earlier House of Lords decision of
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, the majority held that the
Bolam standard should be the starting point when assessing whether a particular risk
should have been disclosed.3 In Montgomery, the Supreme Court rejected that ap-
proach. Instead, risk disclosure was to be determined by reference to what a reason-
able person in the patient’s position, or this particular patient, would be likely to
attach signiﬁcance to.4 Disclosure extended beyond the risks and beneﬁts of treatment
and should include discussion of ‘reasonable alternative or variant treatments’, and the
comparative risks and beneﬁts of the treatments available.5 There were three excep-
tions to this rule so that disclosure would not be necessary if: (i) the doctor reasonably
considered that disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health (the
therapeutic exception); (ii) treatment was necessary and disclosure was not possible
(for example, if the patient was unconscious and required treatment urgently); and
(iii) the patient did not want to receive information about risks.6
Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS Trust7 was one of the
ﬁrst opportunities for the High Court to apply the redeﬁned standard; yet, despite the
Supreme Court’s express rejection of Bolam in this context,8 McGowan J applied the
Bolam test (although without explicit reference to it) when reaching her decision.9
This suggests a persisting judicial deference to the medical profession, which is
supported by the construction of the judgment. This may result in the perpetuation
of Bolam in informed consent cases.
This commentary explores the implications of Grimstone, beginning with an exposi-
tion of Montgomery’s redeﬁning of the standard of disclosure in informed consent to
medical treatment before summarising the background, legal framework, questions
and judgment in Grimstone. It then explores how the decision and reasoning in
Grimstone reﬂects ongoing judicial deference to the medical profession, before consid-
ering what the outcome may have been had the Montgomery standard been properly
applied. It concludes that, whilst judicial deference to the medical profession persists,
application of the redeﬁned standard of disclosure in judicial decision-making may
not prioritise patient’s interests as the Supreme Court intended.10
MONTGOMERY: REDEFINING THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE
Prior to the decision in Montgomery the adequacy of disclosure to a patient undergo-
ing medical treatment was determined by reference to the Bolam standard,11 subject
in later cases to disclosure of ‘signiﬁcant risk[s], which would affect the judgment of a
2 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587 (McNair J).
3 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871.
4 Montgomery (n1) [87].
5 ibid.
6 ibid [85, 88, 91].
7 [2015] EWHC 3756 (QB).
8 Montgomery (n 1)[86] (Lord Kerr and Lord Reed).
9 Grimstone (n 7) [12(iv)].
10 Rob Heywood and Jose´ Miola, ‘The Changing Face of Preoperative Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the
Heart of the Matter’ [2017] 133 LQR 296.
11 Sidaway (n 3).
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reasonable patient’.12 The application of Bolam in this context had been criticised for
failing to secure patient autonomy, which is the underlying purpose of informed con-
sent,13 and in Montgomery, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to redeﬁne the
standard of disclosure.
The case concerned the failure of an obstetrician to disclose to her pregnant patient
the risk of shoulder dystocia associated with vaginal delivery, and to discuss alternative
delivery by way of caesarean section. Shoulder dystocia occurred during the birth result-
ing in the baby sustaining cerebral palsy and a brachial plexus injury. It was also alleged
that the labour had been negligently managed but that claim was not pursued in the
Supreme Court. The claim based on lack of informed consent failed in the lower
courts.14 Following the majority in Sidaway, they applied the Bolam standard and con-
cluded that based on the medical evidence, non-disclosure of the risk of shoulder dystocia
and subsequent injury to the baby ‘was in conformity with proper medical practice’.15
Mrs Montgomery appealed to the Supreme Court who upheld her appeal. They con-
cluded that ‘social and legal developments’ meant there had been a move away from a
model of medical paternalism, towards one of patient autonomy and as such, Bolam
should no longer be treated as the applicable standard of disclosure.16 Instead, a patient’s
right to decide what treatment to undergo entitled that patient to be told of the material
risks of a procedure and its reasonable alternative or variant treatments. Whether a risk
was material should be judged by reference to those risks that a reasonable person in the
patient’s position would be likely to regard as signiﬁcant, or those risks that the doctor
knew or should have known the particular patient in question would be likely to ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant.17 Applying that test, Mrs Montgomery was entitled to have been told of the risk
of shoulder dystocia and the alternative of caesarean section as a means of delivery.18
Eight months after this judgment was handed down, the case of Grimstone was
heard before McGowan J in the High Court.19
GRIMSTONE : APPLYING THE REDEFINED STANDARD?
Background
The key question in the case was what information the claimant, Mrs Grimstone,
should have been given about bilateral hip implant surgery performed by her treating
surgeon, Professor Field. She was referred to Professor Field (an orthopaedic surgeon
who specialised in hip replacement surgery) in 2007 as she had bilateral hip pain and
stiffness. At the time of her referral she was in her mid-50s and a keen sportswoman
with a particular interest in horse riding. She sought a referral to Professor Field after
her own research indicated that the Centre where he worked offered the best
12 Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] ECC 167, [21] (Lord Woolf MR).
13 See, for example, Margaret Brazier, Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law,
(1987) 7 Legal Stud 169, 185; Harvey Teff, ‘Medical Models and Legal Categories: An English Perspective’
(1993) 9 J Contemp Health L Pol’y 211, 225.
14 Montgomery (n 1) [1–3].
15 ibid [235].
16 ibid [81, 86].
17 ibid [87].
18 ibid [94].
19 Grimstone (n 7).
Grimstone v Epsom • 667
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
edlaw
/article-abstract/26/4/665/4657173 by U
niversity Library user on 09 April 2019
treatment for hip replacements. She was familiar with hip replacement surgery as her
father and mother-in-law had both previously undergone this procedure.20
Mrs Grimstone met with Professor Field in January 2008 and he advised her that
both hips were ‘equally bad’, recommending that she undergo hip replacement sur-
gery. Given her age, he advised her that she was likely to require further hip replace-
ments in the future and so he recommended that a bone-conserving implant be used.
Whilst Mrs Grimstone’s father’s hip replacement had lasted for 30 years, her mother-
in-law had suffered eight dislocations after her replacement surgery. Unsurprisingly,
Mrs Grimstone wanted to avoid these problems whilst having an ‘option that gave her
the quickest recovery time, was as good an option as possible and lasted as long as
possible’.21
Professor Field advised her that the implant he proposed using was a metal-on-
metal implant which would offer greater stability whilst conserving bone.22 The im-
plant in question was a ‘Mitch’ implant which Professor Field had designed. Mrs
Grimstone, however, believed that a ‘Charnley’ implant was to be ﬁtted which was the
implant that her father had received. In addition, Professor Field did not tell her that
the Mitch implant was a relatively new implant and as such there was a lack of data
about its long-term failure and success rates.23 That he had not given her this informa-
tion was not disputed;24 yet surprisingly the case proceeded to court on the question
of whether he should have done so.
The hip replacement surgery went ahead on 22 April 2008 but within two years it
had failed and Mrs Grimstone required further surgeries with ongoing pain and dis-
ability, although there had been some improvement by the time her case was heard.25
Legal Framework and Questions
The judgment records Mrs Grimstone’s claim against Professor Field as being
founded on the basis that she had not given informed consent to the surgery because
he had not advised her of the surgical options available to her, or the lack of data
about the failure and success rates of the Mitch implant used in the procedure he per-
formed.26 McGowan J recognised that when deciding the claim the applicable stan-
dard of disclosure was that set out in Montgomery.27 However, because the
Montgomery decision was only published eight months before the trial in Grimstone, it
is likely that the evidence in the case would have been prepared with the Sidaway/
Pearce standard in mind. This is due to the time lag that occurs in this type of case
between preparing and disclosing evidence, and trial taking place.
20 ibid [1, 5(i) and (ii)].
21 ibid [8(a)(i)-(iii)].
22 Although not known about at the time of Mrs Grimstone’s surgery, subsequent research indicated many pa-
tients with metal-on-metal implants experienced soft tissue necrosis, hip pain and poor outcomes with revi-
sion surgery due to metal particles breaking off from the implant: see Medicine and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency,Medical Device Alert MDA/2010/033, issued 22 April 2010.
23 Grimstone (n 7) [8(a)(vi)-(viii) and (b) (iv)].
24 ibid [12(iv)].
25 ibid [5(vi) and (ix), 13].
26 ibid [2].
27 Montgomery (n 1).
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When referencingMontgomery within the judgment, instead of simply citing the one-
paragraph redeﬁned standard of disclosure, McGowan J cited a lengthy eighteen para-
graph extract from the case which incorporated the reasoning for redeﬁning the standard
of disclosure, although she did not rely on that reasoning within her judgment.28
Based upon the standard of disclosure set out inMontgomery,29 one would think that
there were four key aspects relevant to the decision in Grimstone: (i) its conﬁrmation
that the Bolam standard no longer applied in determining what information a patient
should be given; (ii) its requirement to disclose material risks, those being risks that
were likely to be signiﬁcant to a reasonable patient, or this particular patient; (iii) its
inclusion of the requirement to disclose reasonable alternative or variant treatments;
and (iv) its requirement that patients be made aware of the comparative risks and
beneﬁts of the proposed treatment and reasonable alternatives or variants of it.
McGowan J, however, did not proceed in this way but instead concluded there
were three principles ofMontgomery applicable to this case:
1. The fundamental right to be properly informed of the nature and risks of the
procedure.
2. Information should be given in a way that is comprehensible.
3. This was not a case where the withholding of any information could be justiﬁed
on clinical grounds.30
In framing the Montgomery standard in this way, McGowan J lost sight of the need
to focus upon whether the lack of data about the failure and success rates of the Mitch
implant was a material risk, and whether the other implants available amounted to al-
ternative or variant treatments that should have been discussed with Mrs Grimstone,
together with their comparative risks and beneﬁts. Instead, from the three principles
of Montgomery she identiﬁed McGowan J concluded the four questions she needed
to address were:
1. What had Mrs Grimstone been told about the procedure?
2. Did Professor Field do what was reasonable to ensure that she understood?
3. Which procedure would she have chosen in any event?
4. Was he obliged to tell her about the limited data available on the device used?
McGowan J failed to recognise that the third question could not be addressed with-
out identifying what alternative implant options were available and the risks and beneﬁts
of each. This glaring omission meant that no consideration was given in the judgment
to the available alternative implants and their comparative risks and beneﬁts.
The Judgment
Ultimately, Mrs Grimstone’s claim failed. In addressing the four questions she had
identiﬁed, McGowan J concluded that Professor Field had given her sufﬁcient
28 Grimstone (n 7) [6].
29 Montgomery (n 1) [87].
30 Grimstone (n 7) [7].
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information about the nature of the surgery to be performed and its risks.31 This was
because she (wrongly, in the opinion of this author) focused on the question of
information given about the risks of the surgical procedure itself, rather than what was
(or was not) disclosed about the implant to be used within it, and its alternatives.
There was no dispute that those alternatives had not been discussed.32
Following on from this, McGowan J concluded the steps taken to make sure Mrs
Grimstone understood the nature and risks of surgery were sufﬁcient because
Professor Field had discussed the surgery and its risks with her, given her the opportu-
nity to ask questions, and provided an information booklet and a DVD.33 Again,
McGowan J failed to address the absence of a discussion about alternative implants
although it was not disputed that these had not been discussed.
McGowan J also concluded that Mrs Grimstone would have chosen the same
procedure in any event. Here, she seemed to equate the procedure with the choice of
implant saying that this was the option with the quickest recovery time and greatest
stability, both of which were important to Mrs Grimstone.34 However, her failure to
consider the alternative implants and their comparative risks and beneﬁts meant there
was a lack of consideration in the judgment as to how they would compare in terms
of recovery time and stability. This was signiﬁcant given the lack of data about the
long-term failure and success rates of the Mitch implant in comparison to other
implants where such data was available. She also did not address the other areas of
concern for Mrs Grimstone which were having as good an option as possible, that
would last for as long as possible.35
McGowan J did consider whether Professor Field was obliged to disclose the lim-
ited information available on the Mitch implant?36 On a Montgomery approach, the
question should have been whether the lack of information about the failure and
success rates of the implant amounted to a material risk.37 Given that, the lack of data
meant it was unknown for how long the implant would last, and that having an option
that would last as long as possible was important to Mrs Grimstone, it is certainly argu-
able that this did amount to a material risk that should have been disclosed. However,
when addressing this question McGowan J instead applied Bolam, noting that whilst
the medical expert who gave evidence on behalf of Mrs Grimstone suggested the lack
of data should have been disclosed, that could not ‘outweigh the view of the equally
expert witness called by the Defendant [. . .] that a reasonable body of doctors in the
same position would not have given such information’.38 This decision is plainly wrong
as it is a clear application of Bolam which McGowan J knew had been explicitly rejected
inMontgomery39 as that rejection is referred to within her judgment.40
31 ibid [12(i)].
32 ibid [12(iv)].
33 ibid [12(ii)].
34 ibid [12(iii)].
35 ibid [8(a)(ii)].
36 ibid [12(iv)].
37 Montgomery (n 1) [87].
38 Grimstone (n 7) [12(iv)].
39 Montgomery (n 1) [86].
40 Grimstone (n 7) [6].
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Based on her consideration of the four questions she had identiﬁed, McGowan J
concluded Mrs Grimstone’s claim failed as the case ‘that she did not give truly
informed consent [had] not been made out’.41
Following this decision, an appeal was ﬁled on behalf of Mrs Grimstone that was
due to be heard on 24 May 2017. The day before the hearing, however, it appears
that the appeal was withdrawn as it was dismissed without a hearing taken place.42 No
reason was given for the dismissal but given the failure to apply Montgomery and the
clearly incorrect application of Bolam, it is unlikely that it was withdrawn on the mer-
its of the case.
Whilst High Court decisions are not binding on other courts the case does suggest
that, despite Montgomery’s clear rejection of Bolam, the Bolam standard may continue
to be applied in the lower courts. In the Grimstone case this seemed to occur because
of persisting judicial deference to the medical profession.
GRIMSTONE : AN EXAMPLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
The application of Bolam in cases concerning a doctor’s standard of care is seen as evi-
dence of a tendency ‘to show considerable deference to doctors’ by the judiciary.43
Whilst the application of that standard was explicitly rejected in Montgomery,44 there
is a real risk that a judicial attitude of deference remains. This section explores how
this attitude appeared to shape the judgment in Grimstone.
McGowan J’s application of the Bolam standard in reaching her decision on
whether information should have been disclosed involved rejecting one medical view
in favour of another. The judgment reveals that the view of the defendant’s medical
expert that the information did not require disclosure was supported by other medical
professionals—he was reﬂecting the view of ‘a reasonable body of doctors’.45 In con-
trast, the view of the claimant’s medical expert that the information should have been
disclosed was presented as a singular viewpoint with less force than the opinion of the
defendant’s expert. McGowan J describes the claimant’s expert as ‘express[ing]
concern [. . .] that Mrs Grimstone was not given more details’.46 The judge was,
therefore, inﬂuenced not by an individual medical professional but by one claiming to
represent the views of a section of the medical profession.
Further support for the view that this decision reﬂects judicial deference to the
medical profession can be found in the structure of the judgment in relation to the
presentation of the facts of the case. Winter has argued, in the context of judicial sum-
ming up in criminal trials, that the structure of judicial pronouncements can reveal
hidden biases because the judge has discretion in how they are presented, and the pre-
sentation of facts and law is structured to rationalise the decision made.47 The facts of
41 ibid [13].
42 Case Tracker for Civil Appeals, <http://casetracker.justice.gov.uk/getDetail.do?case_id¼20160455> ac-
cessed on 6 July 2017.
43 Heywood and Miola (n 10) 296.
44 Montgomery (n 1) [86].
45 Grimstone (n 7) [12(iv)].
46 ibid [11(i)].
47 Jo Winter, ‘The Truth Will Out? The Role of Judicial Advocacy and Gender in Verdict Construction’
(2002) 11(3) Soc Legal Stud 343, 345–49.
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a case are not ‘pre-packaged for a judge to recite’, but ‘have to be selected interpreted
and communicated’.48 That process of selection ‘is aimed at persuading the reader of
the logical and emotional force of the judge’s decision’.49
The judgment in Grimstone is constructed in a way that suggests there was a signiﬁ-
cant factual dispute between the parties, although on the key issues of whether alter-
native implants were discussed and what information was given about the longevity of
the Mitch implant, there was no dispute. McGowan J recorded that it was not
Professor Field’s ‘usual practice to provide such material’,50 and that ‘[t]he agreed fact
in this case is that the Professor did not tell Mrs Grimstone anything about the
success rates.’51
The impression of a serious factual dispute is created in several ways. First, in set-
ting out the ‘Background Facts’ McGowan J says these are the ‘agreed facts which
cover a narrow compass’,52 implying many of the facts in the case are in dispute. This
impression is reinforced later in the judgment by dividing summaries of what took
place at various consultations into the ‘claimant’s evidence’ and the ‘defendant’s evi-
dence’. McGowan J then concludes she prefers Professor Field’s evidence to Mrs
Grimstone’s because her ‘recollection is unclear and unreliable’ whereas his evidence
was based on ‘the recorded versions’ present in the medical records.53 However, this
ﬁnding related to the accounts they gave as to what had been said about the form of
surgery to be performed, and not what was said about the implant to be used or
alternatives to it. As noted already in this commentary, it was not disputed that no
information had been given about the Mitch’s longevity or alternative implants and
their comparative risks and beneﬁts, and that was the basis for bringing the claim. The
construction of the facts in the case in this way, therefore, seems unnecessary, other
than to serve as justiﬁcation for preference for the medical view.
A further illustration of McGowan J’s deference to the medical profession can be
found to her approach to the question of reasonable alternatives or variants of treat-
ment. In considering this, she focused on the question of whether there were reason-
able alternatives to hip replacement surgery, summarising one of the allegations of
negligence as being that Professor Field ‘failed adequately to advise the Claimant
about the surgical options available to her’.54 In failing to address the question of what
other implants could have been used (which would have amounted to reasonable vari-
ants of the surgery), she again deferred to the medical profession’s view of the clinical
suitability of the Mitch implant. Her judgment records that Professor Field felt hip re-
placement by way of a Mitch implant was clinically indicated as meeting two of Mrs
Grimstone’s aims of a quicker recovery time and greater stability. As ‘[a]ll the clini-
cians accepted it was an appropriate device to have used,’ she ended her enquiry there
and did not explore the question of the extent to which the Mitch implant and
48 D Nicholson, ‘Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who Kill’
(1995) 3 Feminist Legal Stud 185, 189 and 190.
49 ibid 185, 190.
50 Grimstone (n 7) [10].
51 ibid [12(iv)].
52 ibid [5].
53 ibid [12(i)].
54 ibid [2(i)].
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available alternatives met those aims, and Mrs Grimstone’s additional aim of an
implant that would last as long as possible.55 This approach is in line with Bolam
rather than Montgomery and reﬂects her failure to take on board that the landscape of
informed consent has shifted.
A DIFFERENT OUTCOME?
The decision in Grimstone, in the opinion of this author, cannot be reconciled with
that in Montgomery. As the appeal did not proceed (for reasons unknown), it is
interesting to reﬂect upon what might have been the outcome if the judge had not
misdirected herself.
The ﬁrst question would have been whether alternative implants amounted to a
reasonable variant of treatment. McGowan J’s judgment focuses on the question of
the recovery time and greater stability in determining that the Mitch implant was a
reasonable option.56 However, elsewhere in her judgment she refers to Mrs
Grimstone also wanting an option that would be as good as possible and last as long
as possible.57 Therefore, if the alternative implants fulﬁlled some of these require-
ments, then they would have amounted to reasonable alternatives or variants, particu-
larly as the lack of data on the Mitch implant’s failure and success rates meant it was
unknown how long it would last. That uncertainty, given Mrs Grimstone’s desire for
an option that would last as long as possible, means that it is also likely the absence of
data would have been regarded as a material risk that should have been disclosed.
This leaves the question of causation which has not been addressed in this com-
mentary, the focus being the standard of disclosure. However, in giving her judgment
on this issue, McGowan J was inﬂuenced by Mrs Grimstone’s refusal to answer when
asked in cross-examination whether she would have chosen the Mitch implant if she
had been told it would be the best and longest-lasting option. This left McGowan J in
‘no doubt that she would have followed the recommended course’.58 However, had
she been given this advice it would have been incorrect because, in the absence of
data on the Mitch implant’s failure and success rates, it could not be described as the
best and longest-lasting option. This approach also ignores the statement in
Montgomery that ‘[t]he question of causation must also be considered on the hypothe-
sis of a discussion which is conducted without the patient’s being pressurised to accept
her doctor’s recommendation.’59
CONCLUSION
Heywood and Miola see the decision in Montgomery as reorienting the standard of
disclosure so that the starting point is no longer what doctors think patients should be
told, but what judges think patients should be entitled to know.60 They question,
however, whether that ‘message has been received and interpreted in the manner in
which it was intended’. The decision in Grimstone suggests not, as McGowan J
55 ibid [12(i)-(iv)]
56 ibid [12(i) and (iii)].
57 ibid [8(a)(ii)].
58 ibid [8(a)(ix)].
59 Montgomery (n 1) [103].
60 Heywood and Miola (n 10) 300.
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determined what Mrs Grimstone was entitled to know by reference to what Professor
Field and his medical expert thought that she should have been told. Close analysis,
however, suggests that this decision reﬂects an application of the Bolam standard
rather than the Montgomery standard. This is worrying in a case which acknowledged
the redeﬁned standard and quoted extensively from Montgomery. It suggests that
persisting judicial attitudes of deference to the medical profession could undermine
Montgomery’s impact so that medical opinion, rather than patient’s interests, continue
to deﬁne what information should be disclosed.
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